Soren Brier, Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for Transdisciplinary Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaningful Communication and the Interaction Between Nature and Culture, INTEGRAL REVIEW, June 2013, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 220-263., Cybersemiotics, Vol. 9, No. 2.pdf

p. 222 (3) “Rather than basing our culture on the conception that the highest goal of knowledge is an abstract, non-embodied and globally available (artificial, impersonal) intelligence of information programs, I believe that we should ground our culture(s) on embodied human living (personal as well as interpersonal), i.e. on semiotic intelligence as part of both living nature and human culture, rather than only on the physical science and the worldview behind it.”

p. 230 (11) “Consciousness seems to be a transdisciplinary problem because, among other things, it is the prerequisite of all Wissenschaft. Thus, like McGinn (2000), I think that the hard problem of consciousness is what we can actually know about our own knowing and experiencing and it is therefore also about the limits of scientific explanation. According to the analysis above I do not think that a “science of consciousness” is possible in the form in which we know science today.”

p. 238 (19) “As Kultgen (1959-1960) argued, it is important to note that both Peirce (ibid) and the process philosopher Whitehead (1929) deny Kant’s (1990 [1981]) absolute distinction between nature and freedom, replacing it by a sort of process philosophy.”

p. 239 (20) “Peirce’s view is consistent with Sellars’, but he develops his explanation in the form of his three categories calling empirical observations grounded in Secondness, which only makes sense when interpreted through Thirdness. The problem is: how can I say I know what red is from the fact that some things look red to me? According to both Peirce and Sellers, in order to say anything ‘looks blue’ we would require the abstract universal concept of ‘is blue’, i.e. a concept that is not only connected to the concrete experience or things.”

p. 240 (21) “Thus Peirce’s view of reality is not at all some sort of dualistic mathematical combination of a modern physicalistic view and Platonism. The real in Peirce’s paradigm is not only external things, but also concepts!”

p. 247 (28) “As human observers we find ourselves in language and therefore in intersubjectivity with other linguistic beings. We do not have to postulate the other(s) after becoming aware of ourselves, because they are prerequisites for our becoming aware as linguistic self-conscious beings. We live in language, so to speak, and take it with us wherever we go. We cannot speak of being without knowing: if we exist but don’t know, our existence doesn’t matter. When the becoming becomes aware in language it reflects on what it itself is and it realizes that it never becomes aware alone but only as a process embodied in flesh and language with others; this is fundamental to the definition of what it means to be human. Reality in the form of semiotic objects such as the other, language, culture and society, is established in the process of becoming aware.”

p. 254 (35) “Levels are believed to emerge through emergent processes, when new holons appear through higher-level organization. I have been skeptical about the ability of this paradigm to account for the emergence of life and sense experience and later linguistically borne self-consciousness. But if this system and cybernetic view is placed into a Peircean framework, where living potentialities (Firstness) are processes manifested through constraints and forces (Secondness) into regularities and patterns (Thirdness) in a recursive manner from level to level, it makes much more sense. The new emergent level then acts as a potential for the development of the next level. Levels can form and dissolve when their dynamical parameters are near critical points. Stabilization requires that the system moves further from the critical point into organizing patterns, like energy wells. But one then has to accept a hylozoist view of matter as Hylé.”



See book: Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough (Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication)

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